When does revenge taste sweet? A short tale of revenge

Most everyone is familiar with the saying “revenge tastes sweet”, but is there some truth in this? It is only recently that revenge, and the psychological and behavioral implications, have received any empirical attention. The aim of the present article is to provide an overview on the issue of revenge from a scientific perspective and to gain insight into the potential “functionality” that acts of revenge might have.

Alexandre Dumas’ “The Count of Monte Cristo” is a classic tale of revenge and retribution set in France in the early 19th century. The plot revolves around Edmond Dantés, a first mate aboard a merchant ship who is falsely accused of treason and imprisoned in a dungeon on Château d’If, an island off the coast of Marseille for 14 years. When he finally manages to escape, Edmond returns home disguised as the rich Count of Monte Cristo, and proceeds to ruin the three men who once wronged him. The schemers are so deserving of punishment and Dantes’ plots against them are so intricate and masterful that you might easily experience satisfaction in his retribution. This raises the question why, or more preciselywhen, does revenge taste sweet? Besides answering this question, the aim of the present article is to illuminate the issue of revenge and its social and individual functions from a scientific viewpoint.

A Definition of Revenge

The phenomenon of revenge is as old as mankind itself. Although most people do not want to associate themselves with this seemingly “primitive” notion, they actually enjoy listening to “good” revenge stories. It thus appears as though acts of revenge may even possess some aesthetic appeal to us (Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002). This is especially true for depictions of revenge that are “well-executed”, i.e. depictions which mirror the type and severity of the original provocation and that are carried out in a creative and “fancy” way. In general, revenge was, and still is, the leitmotif in reams of music, literature and motion pictures. Take, for example, Shakespeare’s tragedy “Hamlet” or Clint Eastwood’s Oscar-winning masterpiece “Unforgiven”. Even our daily news reports are full of revenge stories Following the killing of Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden, the news press warned of revenge acts of the terror organization, which soon followed in Pakistan. Another example is the case of Ameneh Bahrami, the Iranian women who has been officially allowed to take out an “eye for an eye” revenge and blind her attacker the same way he did to her. Considering the ubiquity of revenge, it is all the more remarkable that scientific research has largely neglected the topic for a long time, as the Dutch psychologist Nico Frijda stated in 1994. Empirical science has entered the scene of research on revenge relatively late.

A first and important step in the empirical study of this phenomenon is to be precise in our definition of revenge. Revenge is perhaps best defined as the infliction of harm in return for a perceived wrong (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001; Stuckless & Goranson, 1992). It is a response to disrespectful treatment, implying that the offense violated existing norms of fairness (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Gollwitzer, 2009). Thus, it is directly tied to our moral intuitions and subjective notions of justice and deservingness (cf. Bies & Tripp, 2005).

Another important feature of revenge is the magnitude of retaliation; In principle, the revenge should be appropriate and equitable, if only from the avenger's point of view (e.g., Stillwell, Baumeister, & Priore, 2008; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002). Accordingly, the consequences of revenge should be comparable to the harm initially inflicted. However, there are examples showing that in some cases the retributive action is much stronger than the initial provocation, but nevertheless avengers may feel good and have the impression that they are “doing the right thing”.

Revenge may seem like an obvious and instinctive reaction, but it is thus important to examine not only the motivations for such behavior, but also the subsequent satisfaction: Does revenge really taste sweet?

Does Revenge Taste Sweet?

The Swiss neuroscientist Dominique de Quervain and his colleagues (de Quervain et al., 2004) addressed the question of whether revenge tastes sweet in a neuroimaging study. With this technique, scientists are able to elucidate the relationship between brain activity and certain mental functions. To explore the neural basis of punishment, subjects played an economic money exchange game with a second participant while their brains were scanned. If one participant (let’s call him A) decided to donate his money to a second person (B), the total amount was doubled. If B did not give back any money in return (as norms of fairness of course would advise), player A would have the possibility to punish B by delivering penalty points. The results demonstrated that participants did punish the other players, even when those points had to be bought with their own money. These kind of experiments show that punishment is associated with the activation of reward-related areas in our brain. More precisely, the activation took place in the dorsal striatum, which is part of the brain’s reward system and involved in many other reward-related behavior, such as food, sex, and addictive drugs. Furthermore, their results suggest that people anticipated gaining satisfaction from punishing deviants. Thus, de Quervain and his colleagues provide physiological evidence that revenge feels good, and indeed may taste sweet.

In line with these findings, a study conducted by Mario Gollwitzer and Markus Denzler in 2009 demonstrated that after participants took revenge, aggression-related thoughts were inhibited. This seems to be another positive effect of taking revenge. However, and importantly, this was only true for certain conditions, but we will get to that later. Further support for this notion comes from Arlene Stillwell and her colleagues (2008). They found the same effect in the opposite direction, such that people who did not engage in revenge after being provoked felt angrier.

On the contrary, there are also findings that indicate that revenge may not always be beneficial for the avenger. In a study reported by Kevin Carlsmith and colleagues (2008), people who took revenge were less satisfied compared to those who did not have a chance to take revenge, or those who only fantasized about taking revenge. Specifically, avengers seemed to ruminate more about their “tantalizer” and whether they really “got even” by way of their retribution.

Regardless of these conflicting results, the evidence described above suggests that there is some truth in the popular expression that “revenge tastes sweet”. This brings up the question: When exactly does it feel good to take revenge, and what makes revenge taste so sweet?

Delivering a Message or Equalizing Pain?

Gollwitzer and colleagues (Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011) suggest that there are two general ways in which revenge is experienced positively. First, it may be the urge to see the offender suffer the way oneself did. This implies that an equal level of suffering between oneself and the harm-doer may lead to the feeling of satisfaction, whereby it should not matter whether the victim is responsible for the revenge (just so long as the offender comes to suffer). Thus, seeing the pants of my scheming colleague rip during a presentation would be satisfying to me even if I am not personally responsible for his bad luck. We refer to this as the so-called “comparative suffering hypothesis” (Frijda, 1994). An alternative notion holds that it is more likely that revenge aims to deliver a message to the offender. Perhaps we want to make clear that the perpetrator did something very wrong and therefore needs to be punished. When this message hits home, we may feel satisfied. We refer to this assumption as the so-called “understanding hypothesis”. Reviewing the existing evidence, there are reasonable arguments for both hypotheses.

For the first hypothesis, an offense causes an affective imbalance between the offender and the victim, and in turn the victim tries to reduce this imbalance (see Frijda, 1994). This goal can only be fulfilled when the harm-doer experiences harm comparable to the amount of harm the victim endured. There are indeed studies that provide support for this “comparative suffering” notion. For example, when people learn that the offender suffers a misfortune, observers’ tendency to deliver punishment diminishes (e.g., Austin, 1979). The second hypothesis, the “understanding” hypothesis,puts an emphasis on communication between victim and offender. In this case, it is important that the offender realizes that revenge was imposed on him, because his or her prior behavior (cf. Miller, 2001).

Gollwitzer and his colleagues (Gollwitzer, Meder, & Schmitt, 2011) recently conducted a set of three laboratory experiments to test both hypotheses in one design, in which participants had to punish an ostensible second participant. In one of their studies, participants took part in a lottery in which they could gain or lose extra money after they received harsh feedback on an essay they wrote. The real participants drew lots, which determined the allocation of money to the ostensible partner. One half of the people drew “power” lots which enabled them to deduct money from the deviant person, and thus they were able to punish the deviant for the unfair treatment. The other half of the participants “accidentally” drew a “lose” lot, which made the ostensible partner and former harm-doer lose money “by fate”. Next, Gollwitzer and colleagues varied whether or not participants received a message from the ostensible harm-doer in which she/he insinuates that the punishment was due to her/his unfair behavior (“Shit happens! Too bad for me, but maybe this is the price I have to pay for being so mean to you …”). Finally, they measured whether people were satisfied and if they had the impression that “everyone got what he or she deserved”.

Interestingly, findings across all studies provided much stronger support for the “understanding hypothesis” than the “comparative suffering hypothesis”, i.e. people felt the most satisfaction and deservingness when they took revenge and the harm-doer understood that the punishment was due to his prior harmful behavior. When the offender did not write such an “understanding” message, victims experienced just as much satisfaction as those who learned that their partners were lucky and won in the lottery (as the second study in this series suggests).

Hence, the experience of satisfaction and the perception of re-established justice seem to demand more than just a balance in the amount of suffering. Rather, a crucial goal underlying vengeful behavior seems to be that avengers want to deliver a message to the perpetrator, and make the perpetrator aware that he/she did something wrong.

However, it should be noted that the results should not be interpreted in such a way that retributive punishment is ultimately motivated by a desire to feel better. Rather, it seems to be motivated by a desire to establish justice; through punishment the perpetrator gets what he deserves (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006), which subsequently leads to a feeling of satisfaction. A recent paper by Gollwitzer and Bushman (in press) provides further evidence that retributive punishment is not solely motivated by the desire to feel better but rather to re-establish justice. In their studies, participants punished a wrong-doer regardless of their expectation to improve their own mood.

At this point one might wonder: Why is it so important to know why revenge can be sweet? It can be argued that finding out what truly satisfies people when taking revenge may help to detect the underlying motivational roots of this behavior. Or, put differently: What people hope to achieve by taking revenge, and what gives them the feeling of justice being restored may be derived from their emotional reaction to these type of behavior.

Nevertheless, revenge may only be considered as one side of the coin. Due to the fact that revenge is likely to impose costs upon the avenger (e.g., counter-revenge), “forgiveness” strategies are developed (e.g., McCullough, 2008). The so-called “forgiveness system” inhibits revenge, when the costs of such behavior outweigh the benefits. Consequently, one should keep in mind that revenge is thus not the only means for challenging injustice.

Coda

The results presented here should not be understood as a call to never suppress the desire for revenge, but rather to refrain from overreacting and carrying out the more destructive forms – like violence – or in the worst case: murder. Instead, it is better to exactly think about what one wants to accomplish with revenge. Indeed, sometimes revenge can be sweet, but like all sweet things it should be consumed in moderation.

References

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