Due to moral, religious and cultural sensibilities, the topic of abortion still gives rise to controversy in many countries. In this post, I will discuss our research showing how language used in abortion discourse can affect people’s attitudes by changing their attributions of humanity to unborn (Mikołajczak & Bilewicz, 2015).
How do we make moral judgments? Are people cold, calculating Vulcans? Or are they affectively hot hedonists? Researchers often present morality as a war between vying ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ processes, but in this two-part blog post I argue that the distinction is a false choice. Morality is both hot and cold, but not in the way previous research leads people to believe.
Is blame for retribution and revenge? Or is blame for managing others’ behavior? I argue that while the former answer is dominant in social psychology, it predicts a dysfunctional system of blame that explains only a small portion of why people blame. Instead, I suggest that blame is better understood as a tool for changing the way people behave.
In this post, I describe how two core motives of human social behavior—the need for understanding and the need for control—shape people’s responses to disaster. Using the disappearance of Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 as an example, I describe how people seek to maintain meaning (related to understanding) and to re-establish certainty (related to control) after unforeseen disasters.
Despite the resurgence of interest in free will, there remains confusion and disagreement regarding free will’s role in social life, in particular, how people understand free will and whether free will guides blame and praise for others. In this blog post I argue that we need to pay closer attention to the folk concept of free will in order to resolve the confusion surrounding free will in everyday life.
Morality colors the way we view the world, but how it influences our judgments of others is a controversial debate. One popular view is that morality biases people’s perceptions of others—specifically others’ intentions. I suggest that this view is incorrect. Instead, valence, not morality, guides perception, and it does so in a way that may be adaptive.