On the dark and bright sides to vengeance: Cognitive, behavioral and affective consequences of aggression

In the present article it is argued that aggression or more specifically, taking revenge has contrary to previous research findings not only negative (i.e., aggression increasing) but also positive (i.e., aggression reducing) consequences. Whereas aggressive thoughts and aggressive behavior might be reduced by taking revenge, negative feelings most likely increase. Thus, a fine-grained analysis of the consequences of revenge is warranted.

In September 2004, Ameneh Bahrami turned down a marriage proposal of Majid Movahedi – not for the first time. This rejection had severe consequences for Ameneh: One evening Majid ambushed her and poured sulfuric acid into her face. Her face, her eyes, her lips and her tongue were burned. Ameneh´s face is now disfigured and she is blind in both eyes. Upon a plea from Ameneh, the perpetrator Majid was sentenced to the same punishment: He will be blinded in both eyes from acid drops – most likely by Ameneh herself, who asked for the right to carry out the punishment herself. Many interesting psychological questions arise from this case as well: Would Ameneh feel better after she dropped acid into the eyes of Majid? Would it help her to think less of him and of harming him, and ultimately help her overcoming this traumatic event? In the following, we will address these questions from a psychological point of view, which boil down to the more general issue of whether taking revenge is beneficial or harmful for the avenger: Does it feel good to take revenge? Does it reduce aggression in general? 

We assume that the effects of aggression are not inevitably good or bad as suggested by traditional views on aggression. The notion of Catharsis, the idea that aggressing reduces aggression in the future, has a long history in Philosophy and (Social)-Psychology alike. In Philosophy, already Aristotle claimed that typically negative feelings expressed in a drama cause the audience to re-experience these feelings: this leads to a vicarious expression of their emotion and therefore to a reduction of this emotion in the audience. In Psychology, Lorenz (1974), for example, assumed in his instinct model that organisms constantly build up aggressive energy. Since the organism cannot endlessly accumulate aggressive energy it needs to be released at some point. After the energy has been released – typically through an aggressive act – subsequent aggression is less likely to occur. Consequently, any aggressive act (such as taking revenge) is cathartic and can reduce subsequent aggression and might, in this sense, be beneficial. Thus, from this point of view, aggression is inevitable and moreover necessary at some point to restore psychological balance. In sharp contrast, the General Aggression Model (GAM, Anderson & Bushman. 2002), one of the most prominent current models on aggression in (Social)-Psychology, assumes that aggression is not inevitable. More specifically, aggression occurs through an interplay of situational and personality factors. These, however, do not necessarily lead to aggression. If aggression nevertheless occurs, it fosters inevitably subsequent aggression through, among other mechanisms, increasing negative affect and activating thoughts related to aggression. Thus, according to this model, aggressing increases future aggression.

We suggest that a fine-grained analysis of aggression is needed to account for this complex phenomenon. In the following, we will attempt such an analysis. We will look at different psychological variables known to influence aggression: cognition, affect, and behavior. Contrary to past and current reasoning about aggression, we claim that aggression can either increase or decrease future aggression. We will argue that revenge has different effects on cognition, affect, and behavior. Whereas hostile affect increases, aggressive thoughts and even aggressive behavior can be reduced upon taking revenge. We will apply our analysis to the example of Ameneh Bahrami to illustrate – admittedly in a speculative manner – how different psychological processes might be differently affected by taking revenge.

We will begin our analysis with cognitions related to aggression; more specifically, with aggressive thoughts that are activated in memory. It is known that thoughts are one determinant of behavior (see Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). Aggressive thoughts that are activated in memory typically lead to behavior that is congruent with the activated concepts. To give an example, reading of the recent heavyweight championship prize fight and thereby reading and thinking of aggression, can increase the likelihood of aggressive acts (see Phillips, 1983).

Figure 1: A simplified schematic depiction of an associative network

Figure 1: A simplified schematic depiction of an associative network

This notion builds upon the idea that knowledge in memory is stored in an associative network (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; see Figure 1 for a simplified schematic depiction). Memory content that is closely related is stored close to each other. If one piece of content is activated, its activation spreads across the network and activates other related content. For example, reading or thinking about the word “harm” activates other related words such as “hit” or “fist”. More importantly, the activation of such content increases the likelihood that respective behavior will be exerted. Thus, thinking about aggression will increase the likelihood that someone shows aggressive behavior – especially in ambiguous situations, in which accessible thoughts can influence the interpretation of the situation. For instance, if someone bumps into another person, one might interpret this as a voluntary provocation if aggressive thoughts are accessible in mind. However, without such thoughts in mind, one might interpret the same behavior as an act of unthoughtfulness. Similarly, acting aggressively will increase thoughts related to aggression, which might then in turn increase aggressive behavior (for a review see Todorov & Bargh, 2002). This reasoning is in line with the GAM: Acting aggressively or thinking of aggression increases the accessibility of aggressive thoughts.

However, our own research has repeatedly demonstrated that acting aggressively does not inevitably increase thoughts related to aggression. More specifically, we could show that imaginary acts of aggression (Denzler, Förster, & Liberman, 2009; Denzler, Förster, Liberman, Rozenman, 2010) or taking revenge (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009) can reduce thoughts that are related to aggression (see also Denzler, Häfner, & Förster, 2010). We showed that thoughts related to aggression are inhibited in memoryif the aggressive act fulfills a goal. Aggressive acts without goal-fulfillment, however, increase the accessibility of aggression. To give an example, if we have the goal to harm a provocateur, fulfilling this goal (through harming the provocateur) reduces the accessibility of aggressive thoughts. However, hitting a punching bag – which is an aggressive act that does, not fulfill the goal of harming the provocateur – does not decrease aggressive thoughts (see Denzler et al., 2009 and Bushman, 1999). Why is that the case? If we have the goal to harm someone, everything that is related to the goal might be highly active in memory: the goal itself, means to achieve the goal, etc.

After the goal has been fulfilled, however, this heightened accessibility of aggressive thoughts loses its functionality and moreover might interfere with other goals. Consequently, goal-related constructs are inhibited in memory (see also Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2009); we think less of aggression after aggression has fulfilled a goal. As we will discuss later, we also behave less aggressive after such goal-fulfillment. Notably, according to our model, no aggressive act á la Lorenz reduces aggression. In fact, aggression without goal-fulfillment (such as hitting a punching bag while having the goal of harming a provocateur) increases aggression (Denzler et al., 2009).

When is an aggressive goal fulfilled? Is it just enough to harm the initial aggressor or provocateur? Our research demonstrates that this is not sufficient. More specifically, the target of the retributive act must signalize that he understood that he was harmed because he did something wrong beforehand. Without this understanding, revenge does not reduce the accessibility of aggressive thoughts (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009). Is aggressive goal-fulfillment necessary? Many times, the aggressive act itself might fulfill other higher order goals, such as the restoration of justice or equity (cf., Donnerstein & Hatfield, 1982; Hammock, Rosen, Richardson, & Bernstein, 1989), or merely solving a conflict. If these goals are fulfilled, the aggressive goal is not needed anymore and the goal itself, and content associated with it, should subsequently be inhibited. We could show that a non-aggressive act of goal-fulfillment inhibits the accessibility of aggressive thought as well (Denzler et al., 2009). However, the inhibition of aggressive thoughts is stronger after aggressive goal-fulfillment compared to non-aggressive goal-fulfillment.

To summarize, aggressive thoughts are not inevitably increased through aggressive acts. Aggressive acts that fulfill a goal can decrease aggressive thoughts in memory – acts of aggression without goal-fulfillment, however, will increase aggressive thoughts.

Coming back to the example of Ameneh: She thinks about harming Majid, how to harm him and about how he will be blinded. These thoughts are highly active in her memory, especially because it is her goal to harm Majid. However, after she had fulfilled this goal one could expect that she thinks less about it – if Majid shows some insight and understanding that he was blinded because he blinded Ameneh beforehand. This might point to a dangerous pitfall: If Majid does not signal some kind of understanding for his punishment, Ameneh will nevertheless think of harming Majid. Let´s now turn to another important component: How would Ameneh feel after harming Majid?

As mentioned above, people belief in Catharsis (see Russel et al., 1995). One reason might be that physiological arousal caused through initial provocation is decreased by taking revenge. Indeed, in a review of studies on Catharsis, Geen and Quanty (1977) showed that physiological arousal is decreased after aggressing against the initial provocateur and if no revenge from him is expected. Aggressing against other targets, however, did not decrease arousal. These findings parallel the findings on the inhibition of aggressive constructs upon goal-fulfillment reported above.

Second, people might engage in aggressive acts to improve their moods. In this sense, acting aggressively may serve the goal to regulate one’s own emotion. In a series of experiments, Bushman, Baumeister and Phillips (2001) demonstrated that people do indeed vent their anger if they believe that this might make them feel better compared to people who do not belief in it. Is venting one’s anger by harming others a successful emotion regulation strategy? Do people indeed feel better after harming others? Bushman and colleagues (2001) showed that people who believe that venting one’s anger feel worse after aggressing compared to people who do not believe in it.

In a related vein, Carlsmith, Gilbert and Wilson (2008) investigated whether people can accurately forecast their affective reactions to revenge. They found that participants predict that taking revenge makes them feel better, but that this affective forecasting does not reflect reality: Participants felt worse after they enacted revenge compared to participants who did not take revenge. Moreover, Carlsmith and colleagues showed that people felt even worse when they took revenge themselves and not when they observed someone else taking revenge. To summarize, people think that they feel better after taking revenge, but in reality they do not feel better, they feel even worse (see also Denzler, Häfner, & Förster, 2010). This might point to a dark side of vengeance. One does hope that taking revenge makes you feel better, but at the end, you are worse off after harming someone else.

Thus, Ameneh might think that she feels better after harming Majid, but at the end, she might not do so. Most likely she might feel even worse afterward.

Let’s turn to the last and probably most important component of vengeance – behavior. Does acting aggressively have an impact on subsequent aggression? According to the above-mentioned instinct model by Lorenz (1974) any aggressive act empties aggressive energy and hence subsequent aggression is less likely to occur in the near future. Quite contrary, the GAM (Anderson & Bushman, 2002) predicts that acting aggressively increases aggression through various routes. One of them is the heightened accessibility of aggressive thoughts. As mentioned above, accessible thoughts are one determinant of behavior. Aggressive acts activate thoughts related to aggression, which in turn increases the likelihood for future aggression. However, we could show that aggression that fulfills a goal does not only lead to fewer aggressive thoughts (Denzler et al., 2009 and Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009), but also to less aggressive behavior (Denzler et al., 2009). Most notably, alternative non-aggressive means of goal-fulfillment reduced aggressive behavior even more than aggressive means of goal-fulfillment. This finding points to a dissociation within the results obtained for the accessibility of thoughts. In our studies, we found that aggressive goal-fulfillment reduced aggressive thoughts more than non-aggressive goal-fulfillment. For behavior, we found the reversed pattern: Participants who fulfilled their goals with non-aggressive means showed less aggressive behavior than participants who fulfilled their goal with aggressive means. However, no goal-fulfillment led to more aggressive behavior than (aggressive and non-aggressive) goal-fulfillment. This might be regarded as another bright side of taking revenge: Under specific circumstances it might decrease aggressive behavior in future.

What follows from this last part of the analysis for the example of Ameneh? If blinding Majid fulfills her goal, she might behave less aggressive in future. If not, however, this act might increase aggression in future. The tricky question now is: Is the goal fulfilled with blinding Majid? He will be narcotized during this process and will therefore feel much less pain than Ameneh did. His face will also not be disfigured. Is the goal then fulfilled?

Concluding remarks

Coming back to the original question whether taking revenge has beneficial or harmful consequences for the avenger: In order to account for such a complex psychological phenomenon like vengeance, we suggested a multilevel analysis, which showed that vengeance might have negative and positive consequences. However, this was only the starting point of such analysis. More relevant questions arise, especially related to the interaction of the suggested levels. To give an example, one might think that the reduction in aggressive behavior after goal-fulfillment is only short-term, but might increase in the long-run. However, if people do not feel better after taking revenge, why would they show this behavior in future? More research is needed to foster our understanding of vengeance and its underlying psychological processes. Such a research endeavor needs to take the dark sides of vengeance into account as well as its bright sides, which have almost totally been neglected thus far.

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